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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
I. Background to the Study 
The Boko Haram group gained notoriety in 2009 after the alleged extra judicial killing of the 
erstwhile leader of the group by government forces in an attempt to suppress their violence. 
They began as a religious group in Maiduguri, north-eastern Nigeria in 2002. The group has 
since placed Nigeria on international headlines as a result of the violent acts carried out with 
frightening frequency. Churches have been burnt, students kidnapped and killed in cold blood, 
public buildings and transportation systems bombed, whole towns sacked and civilians 
murdered, government installations attacked, women and children sold on the slave market 
among other chilling atrocities. The group is believed to have links with Al Qaeda and has 
reportedly pledged allegiance to ISIS.1 Its style of raiding, suicide bombings and weapons used 
have improved dramatically over time. Despite all the engagements by the Nigeria military, the 
group seem to be gaining more territory and waxing stronger. As a result of the acts of violence 
perpetrated by the group, thousands of civilian casualties have been recorded from 2009 till 
date.  The violence which started in North Eastern Nigeria has spread to border areas of Chad, 
Niger and Cameroon. 
                                                             
1 Aljazeera ‘Boko Haram and defining the Al Qaeda Network’ June 6, 2014. Available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/06/boko-haram-al-qaeda-201463115816142554.html 
(accessed on July 22, 2015). 
BBC ‘Nigeria’s Boko Haram Pledges Allegiance to Islamic State’ March 7, 2015. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31784538 (accessed on July 22, 2015). 
The Daily Star Lebanon ‘ISIS accepts allegiance of Nigeria’s Jihadists Boko Haram’ March 12, 2015. 
Available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2015/Mar-12/290601-is-accepts-allegiance-
of-nigeria-jihadists-boko-haram-tape.ashx (accessed on July 22, 2015). 
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The Nigerian military has been accused of massive arbitrariness in its so called fight against 
terror. The State of Emergency declared by the government gave the military the opportunity 
to violate civilian rights unquestioned. Detention without constitutional guarantees under the 
guise of national security, deaths of thousands of individuals, torture of detainees and 
disappearance of thousands have been nailed at the door of the Nigerian military. Thousands 
remain in custody in sharp contrast with the paltry number of Boko Haram cases that have 
made it to the courts. 
This paper will explore the history of the outbreak of religious related violence in Nigeria and 
the response of Nigeria and the African Union to the acts of the Boko Haram group both legally 
and procedurally. The intervention of the ICC as a viable option to combat the scourge of the 
group will also be examined. Other options such as trial in the Court of third States under the 
principle of universal jurisdiction and a special court jointly facilitated by the States involved will 
also be assessed. 
II. Research Question 
This paper seeks to address the following research questions: 
1. Will the full adoption of the Shari’a legal regime adequately address the agitations of 
Boko Haram and tackle the violence in north-eastern Nigeria?  
2. What are the legal and procedural responses of the Nigerian State and the African 
Union to the Boko Haram Violence?  
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3. Do the acts of Boko Haram fulfil the requirement as War Crimes and Crimes against 
Humanity as defined by the Rome Statute? If they do, does the complementarity 
requirement in the Statute allow the intervention of the ICC? 
4. How effective would prosecution by third States through universal jurisdiction or the 
establishment of a special mechanism, such as a special court for the Boko Haram 
violence, be in dealing with the situation? 
III. Objective of the Study 
The general objective of the research is to address the options for dealing with the Boko Haram 
problem and explore the stance of international criminal law with regards to this peculiar 
circumstance. From the results, one may draw general conclusions to the impact of 
International Criminal Law in similar situations in Africa.  
More directly, the aims of this study are; 
i. To explore the responsibility and the response of Nigeria to investigate and prosecute 
international crimes committed within its territory. 
ii. To examine Nigeria’s legal and procedural framework for investigating and prosecuting 
such international crimes under its available domestic regime. 
iii. To identify the extent of involvement of the ICC and the applicability of the 
complementarity regime of the Court. 
iv. To consider the possible options that could be used to effectively deal with the Boko 
Haram group between the affected States.  
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IV. Significance of the Study 
The Boko Haram group is relatively new as they shot into limelight in 2009.  This implies that 
there is a dearth of legal scholarly work. This research paper is therefore pivotal in 
understanding the legal and procedural loopholes in the Nigerian domestic regime in dealing 
with the Boko Haram group. It has the potential to assist in an understanding of the attendant 
issues and at best may serve as a reference for the relevant authorities. 
This research paper will be very instrumental in shedding light on the legal dichotomies and 
dimensions that presents itself in this very specific situation and serve as a pointer for future 
research on the Boko Haram problem. 
Due to the fact that the field of international criminal law is a constantly developing one, the 
question of the determination of whether the acts of Boko Haram meet the threshold to be 
regarded as international crimes under the Rome Statute would be an important addition to 
the field. 
V. Research Methodology 
This is a qualitative study based upon library research. It will take a critical-analytical approach 
to the pertinent primary and secondary sources with a view to developing defensible answers 
to the research questions.  
Primary sources that will be employed include Statutes, International Conventions, other 
sources of International Law, African treaties and Nigerian Laws. Literatures of International 
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Criminal law, International Law and other secondary sources are also employed. Reference will 
also be made to reports of international NGO’s and other reports. 
VI. Delimitation of the Study 
The scope of this work is limited to the acts that may amount to war crimes and crimes against 
humanity as provided for by the Rome Statute and acts that may amount to terrorism under 
the relevant Nigerian law and the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of 
Terrorism. Due to limited space, this research paper will focus majorly on the acts of Boko 
Haram and will not deal with the crimes committed by the government forces in depth. 
VII. Organisation of the Paper 
This paper is organised into five chapters. The first chapter is an introductory part which 
comprises background of the study, research question, objective of the study, significance of 
the study, delimitation of the study and research methodology.  
Chapter two explores the history of the outbreak of religious-related violence in northern 
Nigeria and the place of the Shari’a legal regime in addressing the acts of Boko Haram as 
advocated for by some scholars. 
The third chapter is devoted to the description of the response of the Nigerian State and the 
African Union to the Boko Haram violence. 
Chapter four explores the intervention of the ICC as an option of dealing with Boko Haram acts. 
It considers the complementarity regime of the ICC as it relates to this specific circumstance. It 
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also compares the acts of Boko Haram with the definition of core crimes specifically crimes 
against humanity and war crimes within the Rome Statute.  
Chapter five explores the other options that may be utilised as a response by the affected 
States. This chapter also concludes the research and gives recommendations. 
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CHAPTER TWO: Historical Background and Outline of the Boko Haram Violence 
2.1 History of Religious-Related Violence in Northern Nigeria 
The violence in Northern Nigeria has its roots in the history of the conservative practice of Islam 
in the region. This dates back to the jihad2 of Sheik Uthman dan Fodio of Sokoto in the first 
decade of the nineteenth century.3 The jihad led to the establishment of a federation of Islamic 
states which recognized the supremacy of the Sultan as its religious and political ruler. The so-
called Fulani Empire administered most of the present Northern Nigeria and Northern 
Cameroon. During the colonial years, the British system of indirect rule preserved the existing 
institutions and the Islamic regime in northern Nigeria which was already firmly entrenched. 
When Nigeria became independent in October 1960, the powerful northern region was still 
largely ruled through the Muslim emirs and their native administrations.4  
On January 15, 1966, Nigeria experienced its first military coup. Closely followed by a second 
one in July of the same year, this resulted in military rule on and off, for about thirty years. The 
advent of military rule changed the structure of Muslim establishment in northern Nigeria. The 
region was carved into six states, political activity was banned, local government was reformed 
and the power of the traditional Islamic leadership structure was reduced significantly. A new 
Constitution was drawn up by the members of the constituent assembly and central to their 
                                                             
2 Jihad is an Arabic word (from Jahada meaning struggle) the original context means to strive and exert 
oneself. Today, it is used to mean ‘holy war’ or an equivalent of the English word ‘crusade’. In this Jihad, 
Sheik Uthman Dan Fodio conquered most of the present day Northern Nigeria and Northern Cameroon 
and established a caliphate see Kent HB Politics of Islamic Jihad (2008) MA Thesis University of Canterbury 
1. 
3 Hickey R ‘The 1982 Maitatsine Rising in Nigeria: A Note’ (1984) 83 African Affairs 252.   
4 Hickey (1984) 253. 
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debate was the position of the Shar’ia system within the Nigerian judicial system. Nigeria 
returned to civilian rule and the Constitution became effective on October 1, 1979.  The 
majority of northern Muslims were reportedly displeased with its so-called secular nature.5 The 
Constitution was subsequently rejected and the religious leaders began to openly advocate for 
the establishment of an Islamic State in northern Nigeria.  
2.2 From Maitatsine to Boko Haram 
2.2.1 The Maitatsine Movement 
The Maitatsine6 group developed against the backdrop of the socio-political problems in 
northern Nigeria before 1980. The period was characterized by acute poverty, youth 
joblessness and insecurity. The emergence of the group signalled the beginning of organized 
violence against the Nigerian State. The group preached a complete rejection of affluence, the 
so-called western education, materialism and any form of technology. The leader was recorded 
to have preached that any Muslim who read any other book beside the Quran is a pagan. The 
members who mostly belonged to the lowest class of the society carried out violent attacks 
against Muslims who did not share their beliefs, those who were considered as pagans, non-
Muslims and the police, who were seen as a tool of the so-called secular State. On December 
18, 1980, armed members of the group ambushed four police units and civilians leaving about 
                                                             
5 Hickey (1984)254. 
6 The leader of the group was a dissident preacher who hailed from Marwa in Cameroon. The name of the 
group developed from the saying of the leader, ‘wanda bata yarda ba Allah ta Tchine’ in Hausa which 
means ‘May Allah curse anyone who disagrees with this version’ later rendered as ‘Maitatsine’. 
See Isichie E ‘The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria 1980-1985: A Revolt of the Disinherited’ (1987) 17 Journal 
of Religion in Africa 195. 
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4,177 people dead.7 Several similar attacks were carried out by members of the group in 
Kaduna and Bulumkutu in 1982, 1984 in Yola and 1985 in Bauchi leading to the death of 
thousands of people.8 The leader of the group was killed by the military in one of such attacks. 
As a result, the members scattered and continued their reign of terror. Although the military 
was able to brutally quash the chain of violence and its spin offs; thousands of lives had been 
lost.  
2.2.2 The Nigerian Muslim Brothers 
The Nigerian Muslim Brothers group developed some years after the maitatsine movement. 
They claimed to have been inspired by the Iranian Ayatollah, Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al- Banna 
of Egypt. Led by Ibrahim Zaky Zaky of Zaria, their ideals consisted of the rejection of the 
Nigerian Constitution, flag and legal institutions and acceptance of the Shari’a legal regime as 
the only recognized legal authority.9 They carried out massive vandalism of government 
installations and attacks on so-called pagans.10 
2.2.3 The Muslim Student Society 
The Muslim Students Society was founded in 1954 and it grew into a national organization. The 
society became radicalized in the 1980s and rejected the Nigerian Constitution and any symbol 
of so-called secularism in the Nigerian State. A violent attack was carried out against Christian 
                                                             
7 Isichie (1987) 196. 
8 Adesoji A ‘The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria’ (2010) 45 2 Africa Spectrum 96. 
9 Kenny J ‘Shari’a and Christianity in Nigeria: Islam and a ‘Secular’ State’ (1996) 26 Journal of Religion in 
Africa 344. 
10 Kenny (1996) 344. 
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faithful who gathered to see the Pope John Paul II on his visit to Kaduna in February 1982. This 
led to the death hundreds of people.11  
2.2.4 Other Related Crises 
Several other similar crises with vast religious undertones in northern Nigeria have to be 
mentioned. The Kano metropolitan riot of October 1982, the Ilorin riot of March 1986, the 
nationwide crisis over Nigeria's membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 
in 1986, the Kafanchan religious riots of March 1987, the Kaduna Polytechnic riot of March 
1988, the riots resulting from the national debate on Shari’a at the Constituent Assembly in 
October/November 1988, the Bayero University crisis of 1989, the Bauchi riots of March/April 
1991, the Kano riot of October 1991, the Zangon-Kataf riot of May 1992, the Kano civil 
disturbance of December 1991 and the Jos crisis.12 Between 1999 and 2008, 28 other conflicts 
were reported; the most prominent of these are the recurrent Jos crises. According to 
Vormbaum and Akinmuwagun,  630 Yoruba, 604 Igbo and 430 Niger Delta People lost their lives 
to the 2011 Jos violence alone, public and private properties worth about 180 Billion Naira 
(over One Billion USD)  were been destroyed in the course of the Jos violence.13  
 
 
 
                                                             
11 Kenny (1996) 344. 
12 Adesoji (2010) 97. 
13 Akinmuwagun TL & Vormbaum M ‘The Nigerian ‘Jos Crisis’ from the Perspective of International Criminal 
Law’ 135 in Werle G Fernandez L Vormbaum M (Eds) ‘Africa and the International Criminal Court’(2014). 
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2.3 Emergence and Rise of Boko Haram  
Boko Haram14 is a militant sect driven by the ideology of a fanatical Islamic practice.15 The 
group began in 2002 as an Islamic splinter group. The ideology of the group is not novel and 
their philosophy is similar to that of earlier groups.  The group in a 2011 leadership statement 
gave an idea of its specific objectives; 
‘*W+e want to reiterate that we are warriors who are carrying out Jihad (religious war) in Nigeria 
and our struggle is based on the traditions of the holy prophet. We will never accept any system 
of government apart from the one stipulated by Islam because that is the only way that the 
Muslims can be liberated. We do not believe in any system of government, be it traditional or 
orthodox, except the Islamic system which is why we will keep on fighting against democracy, 
capitalism, socialism and whatever. We will not allow the Nigerian Constitution to replace the 
laws that have been enshrined in the Holy Qur’an; we will not allow adulterated conventional 
education (Boko) to replace Islamic teachings. We will not respect the Nigerian government 
because it is illegal. We will continue to fight its military and the police because they are not 
protecting Islam. We do not believe in the Nigerian judicial system and we will fight anyone who 
assist the government in perpetrating illegalities.’16 
The group claims to have over 40 000 members in Nigeria and neighbouring African countries, 
including Chad, Benin, Niger Republic, as well as in Somalia and Mauritania.17 The attacks by the 
group gathered momentum after the alleged extra- judicial execution of their leader by the 
                                                             
14 The founders of Boko Haram called themselves Jama'a Ah as-Sunna Li-da'wawa-al Jihad which roughly 
translates from Arabic as ‘People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad’. 
Local Hausa-speaking communities named the group Boko Haram, translated ‘Western education is 
forbidden’, because of its strong position that western education and culture are corrupt and forbidden 
by Islam. 
15 Aghedo I& Osumah O ‘The Boko Haram Uprising: How Should Nigeria Respond?’ (2012) 33Third World 
Quarterly 858. 
16 Boko Haram Statement (Leadership 2011) See Agbiboa D ‘The Ongoing Campaign of Terror in Nigeria: 
Boko Haram versus the State’ (2013) 2 Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 4. 
17 Aghedo & Osumah (2012) 858. 
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Nigerian military in July 2009.18 The group previously had been small and relatively unknown. 
They aim to impose Islamic law in Nigeria and have waged a violent campaign against all forms 
of organized government including traditional rule, western style education and any religion 
other than Islam.19 
 In an October 2012 report, Human Rights Watch estimated that about 1,500 civilians had died 
as a result of the violence perpetrated by the group, by November 2013; estimates showed that 
this figure had risen to 5,000 deaths.20 In the first half of 2014, Human Rights Watch 
documented the death of at least 2,053 people.21 The total estimate from 2009 through July 
2014, revealed that more than 7,000 civilians have died during Boko Haram related unrest and 
violence.22 Boko Haram members have burned numerous churches; some with worshippers 
trapped inside, killed men who refused to convert to Islam and abducted women and 
children.23 
The acts which initially targeted citizens not of the Islamic faith, have become indiscriminate 
and grown to include audacious bombing of the United Nations headquarters building in 
                                                             
18  Human Rights Watch ‘Nigeria: Prosecute Killings by Security Forces’ November 26 2009. Available at 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/11/26/nigeria-prosecute-killings-security-forces  (accessed on March 19 
2015). 
19  Human Rights Watch ‘Those Terrible Weeks in Their Camp Boko Haram Violence against Women and 
Girls in North East Nigeria’ October 2014. Available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria1014web.pdf (accessed on March 15, 2015). 
19 Human Rights Watch Report October 2014 11. 
20 Human Rights Watch Report October 2014 12. 
21 Human Rights Watch Report October 2014 12. 
22 Human Rights Watch Report October 2014 13.  
23 Human Rights Watch ‘Those Terrible Weeks in Their Camp Boko Haram Violence against Women and Girls 
in North East Nigeria’ October (2014) 17.  
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Abuja(Nigeria’s capital city),24 the killing of about 60 schoolboys in their school room in cold 
blood,25 the so-called ‘Baga and Doron-Baga Massacre’ that left about 2000 people dead in a 
weekend,26 the violent kidnapping of over 200 school girls from their school rooms in 2014 in 
Chibok27 among other well orchestrated and executed acts. Deliberate attack of villages, mass 
killings of civilians and abductions particularly of women and children, spread from North 
Eastern Nigeria into border areas of northern Cameroon, Chad and Niger. 
Between July and early September 2014, Boko Haram took control of more than ten major 
towns in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states of north-eastern Nigeria.28 According to UNOCHA, 
an estimated 300,000 people have fled their homes in the three states. As at March 14, 2014, 
Human Rights Watch reports estimated about 470, 000 internally displaced persons and 
another 60,000 displaced Nigerians in Cameroon, Chad and Niger.29 According to BBC, in 2012, 
1,663 civilian lives were lost, in 2013, 2,978 deaths were recorded and in 2014, 9,033 civilians 
                                                             
24 BBC ‘Nigeria Attack: Car Bomb Hits Nigeria’s UN Building’ August 27 2011. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14677957 (accessed on March 19 2015). 
25 Reuters ‘Nigerian Islamist Kills 59 People in Boarding School Attack’ February 26 2014. Available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/26/us-nigeria-violence-idUSBREA1P10M20140226 (accessed on 
July 16, 2015). 
26  BBC ‘Boko Haram Attack: What Happened in Baga?’ February 2 2015. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30987043 (accessed on July 16, 2015). 
27  CNN ‘As many as 200 girls abducted by Boko Haram, Nigerian officials say’ April 16 2014. Available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/04/15/world/africa/nigeria-girls-abducted/index.html (accessed on March 
16, 2015). 
28 Human Rights Watch Report October 2014 16. 
29 Human Rights Watch ‘Nigeria;  Boko Haram Attacks Causes Humanitarian Crisis.  Regional Governments, Agencies 
Should Protect Rights of the Displaced’ March 14 2014. Available at 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/14/nigeria-boko-haram-attacks-cause-humanitarian-crisis (accessed 
on March 18, 2015). 
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were killed by or as a result of Boko Haram violence.30 Boko Haram has been engaged in a war 
over the territory of certain parts of northern Nigeria since declaring an Islamic Caliphate in 
August 2014.31 Frequent attacks have also been carried out in neighbouring Niger, Chad and 
Cameroon. Boko Haram allegedly funds its activities through kidnapping for ransom, a diverse 
network of black market dealings in arms and running a slave market, local and international 
benefactors and links to al-Qaeda and other well funded groups, Al-Shabab in Somalia and 
other local Al-Qaeda affiliates.32 
2.3.1 Acts of Government Forces 
The government forces have been accused of brutality in their attempt to quash the Boko 
Haram violence. In 2012, the government declared the first state of emergency in north-east 
Nigeria. This enabled the forces to commence what it regarded as a massive crackdown on 
supposed members of Boko Haram in the region. The forces have been accused of descending 
into arbitrariness and extra judicial killings while attempting to combat the acts of the group. 
Amnesty International reported that since March 2011, more than 7,000 young men and boys 
have died in military detention and more than 1,200 have been unlawfully killed by the military 
since February 2012.33 In June 2013 alone, about 1,400 corpses were deposited in a mortuary 
                                                             
30 BBC ‘Boko Haram Attack: What Happened in Baga?’ February 2 2015. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30987043 (accessed on July 16, 2015). 
 
32 BBC ‘Who are Nigeria’s Boko Haram Islamists?’ May 4 2015. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13809501 (accessed on October 2, 2015). 
31 Washington Post ‘This is how Boko Haram Funds its evil’ Available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/06/06/this-is-how-boko-haram-funds-its-
evil/ (accessed on July 13 2015). 
33 Amnesty International Report ‘Stars on their Shoulders, Blood on their Hands; War Crimes Committed by 
the Nigerian Military’ 2 June 2015. 
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from Giwa barrack’s detention facility, the notorious detention centre for Boko Haram 
suspects.34 
The government forces have been accused of mass arbitrary arrest and unlawful detention of 
about 20,000 young men and boys, countless acts of torture and ill treatment and enforced 
disappearance of an unascertainable number of people. They have also been accused of failure 
to act when they had knowledge that crimes were to be or being committed by the members of 
the Boko Haram group which led to the death of thousands of people. 
 Detainees have been held outside the protection of the law and have been denied access to 
their families, lawyers or the Courts by the government forces. It has been alleged that 
detainees have not been informed of the reasons for their arrest and their families not given 
knowledge of their fate or whereabouts. Many have been detained for years without charge. 
Although the Nigerian military refused to release official information on the number of persons 
in custody, the detainees are rumoured to be in thousands, among who are senior members of 
Boko Haram.35  
 
                                                             
34 Amnesty International Report ‘Nigeria: Horror in Numbers’ June 3, 2015 available at 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/06/nigeria-horror-in-numbers/(accessed on July 16, 
2015). 
35 Reuters ‘Nigerian Military Arrest Senior Boko Haram Member’ June 18, 2014. Available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/18/us-nigeria-blast-idUSKBN0ET2OD20140618 (accessed on 
October 13, 2015). 
Vanguard  ‘Arrest of Suspected Boko Haram Members in Abia’ June 20, 2014. Available at 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/06/arrest-suspected-boko-haram-members-abia/ (accessed on 
October 13, 2015). Among other high profile arrests of suspected members of Boko Haram who have 
been in custody without trial. 
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2.4 Shari’a Law within the Nigerian Legal System. 
The major agitation of the Boko Haram group is that the Shari’a legal regime be accorded full 
constitutional backing. This would lead to the creation of an Islamic northern Nigeria. Many 
scholars have also argued that providing a proper place for the Shari’a legal regime in the 
Nigeria constitution would solve the Boko Haram problem and put a permanent end to the 
violence. An assessment of the Shari’a legal regime would be essential to understand this 
argument. 
2.4.1 Shari’a during the Colonial Period 
 Shari’a has been variously described as the legal expression of Islam which has its primary 
source in the Qur’an and the Hadiths.36 During the colonial period, the policy of indirect rule 
adopted by the British in Nigeria preserved all existing Islamic institutions. Although Shari’a law 
was not directly recognized, 'native law and custom,' was interpreted to cover the traditional 
norms in force and this included Shari’a law.37 The Shari’a law allowed at that time extended to 
all matters, including criminal and capital offences except for penalties such as mutilation, 
lapidation and crucifixion.38 There was flexibility in its interpretation and application and it 
largely relied on the discretion of the emir or alkali interpreting it.39 Some years later, conflict 
ensued with relation to jurisdiction on the imposition of a death penalty. Subsequently, a 
distinction was made between the jurisdiction of Shar’ia courts and civil courts. Shari’a courts 
                                                             
36 Oba AA ‘Islamic Law as Customary Law: The Changing Perspective in Nigeria’ (2002) 51 International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 819. 
37 Kenny (1996) 340. 
38 Kenny (1996) 340. 
39 Kenny (1996) 340. 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
were allowed to deal with personal status and family law alone, while civil courts would deal 
with criminal law according to a single code applicable to all parts of Nigeria.40 
A native Courts Bill was passed in 1956 which made a distinction between application of Shari’a 
between Muslims and non-Muslims and provided the appropriate procedures for both 
circumstances.41 
2.4.2 Shari’a and the Nigerian Constitution 
Nigeria implemented a federal Constitution after independence. Under the Constitution, Shari’a 
law was defined only in relation to civil and personal matters such as marriage, family 
relationships, divorce, child custody, guardianship of infants and similar areas without criminal 
jurisdiction.42 It was not to be applied nationwide but only in places with a sizeable number of 
Muslims.  A dispute in this area was to be adjudicated by the Shari’a court of the relevant state 
or the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) on the basis of original jurisdiction and the Shari’a court of 
appeal as an appellate jurisdiction. 
On 8 October, 1999, Zamfara state became the first in Nigeria to fully implement traditional 
Shari’a in its entirety. This was done by enacting an act for a Shari’a court and court of appeal in 
the state and a Shari’a penal code.43 This Act extended the jurisdiction of the Shari’a court and 
                                                             
40 Kenny (1996) 341. 
41 Kenny (1996) 341. 
42 Galadima H & Elaigwu J ‘The Shadow of Shari’a over Nigerian Federalism’ (2003) 33 Journal of Federalism 
132. 
43 Galadima & Elaigwu (2003) 138. 
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Shari’a court of appeal to include criminal matters. This was done by taking advantage of a legal 
loophole in section 277 of the constitution.44 Section 277(1) provides;  
‘[T]he shari’a Court of Appeal of a state shall, in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be 
conferred upon it by the law of the State, exercise such appellate and supervisory jurisdiction in 
civil proceedings involving questions of Islamic personal law which the court is competent to 
decide in accordance with subsection (2) of this section.’45 
 The first part of Section 277(1) was interpreted to connote that states had the right to confer 
other jurisdictions on the court, in this case, criminal jurisdiction. Subsequently, the legality and 
validity of such interpretation could not be questioned.  
So far, twelve out of the thirty six states in Nigeria have launched the Shari’a legal code, 
encompassing all aspects of Shari’a law including Islamic criminal law.46 All these twelve states 
are in northern Nigeria. Penalties such as decapitations, amputation of limbs, flogging 
fornicators, sentencing adulterers to death by stoning were provided for under the new 
system.47 The enactment of the Shari’a penal code has resulted in an uneasy co-existence of 
two distinct legal regimes in each of the implementing state.48 Its adoption has raised many 
constitutional, legal and social questions which mostly remain unresolved.  
                                                             
44 Section 277(1) was interpreted to mean that the individual states had the right to confer other 
jurisdictions on the court, in this case, the criminal jurisdiction. 
45 Italics mine. 
46 Zamfara, Kano, Sokoto, Katsina, Bauchi,Borno, Jigawa, Kebbi, Yobe, Kaduna, Niger and Gombe States in 
Northern Nigeria have all adopted full implementation of Sharia as at 2002. 
47 Galadima & Elaigwu (2003)139.  
48 Iwobi AU ‘Tiptoeing Through a Constitutional Minefield: The Great Shari’a Controversy in Nigeria’ (2004) 
48(2) Journal of African Law 134. 
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The question of Boko Haram’s agitation for an Islamic state in northern Nigeria is a moot point. 
This is because the areas where the group now hold sway are the principal areas where Shari’a 
law in its entirety have been adopted. Kaniye Ebeku argued that the violence of Boko Haram 
can be effectively solved by constitutionalizing the full dimensions of Shari’a.49  He asserts that 
the appropriate response of Nigeria to Boko Haram is constitutional rather than military. The 
validity of this position is called into question because Shari’a law seems to be powerless in the 
face of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria when it has been adopted in its entirety since 2002. 
This argument does not take cognisant of that fact. The proponents of a constitutional solution 
to the Boko Haram problem do not seem to realise that the system has been fully in place since 
2002 before the Boko Haram violence fully took off. This argument is therefore unsound. This is 
not a recommendable solution due to its unconstitutionality and the fact that its application 
has not been shown to be capable of permanently deterring the operations of the group.  
2.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has explored the history of violence in northern Nigeria. The operations of earlier 
groups with similar objectives and the development of the Boko Haram group have also been 
outlined. An assessment of the place of Shari’a law within the Nigerian legal system has been 
done to understand the soundness of the position that this could be a potential response to the 
Boko Haram agitations. It is concluded that the intricacies of the Boko Haram problem is too 
                                                             
49 Ebeku SK ‘Beyond Terrorism: Boko Haram Attacks and National Constitutional Questions in Nigeria’ 
(2011)1 Sri Lanka Journal of International Law 16. 
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enormous and mere inclusion of Shari’a law in the Constitution does not seem to be capable of 
permanently addressing the problem. 
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CHAPTER THREE: Response to the Boko Haram Violence 
3.1. Domestic Prosecution of acts amounting to International Crimes 
States have a responsibility not only to refrain from interfering with basic human rights but 
additionally to promote and protect it. This obligation is based on the idea that such crimes 
violate obligation erga omnes .i.e. obligation owed to all mankind.50 Principles under which a 
State has jurisdiction to prosecute criminal acts are recognised by international law. A basic one 
is the territorial principle, in which States have jurisdiction over crimes committed in their 
territory. Similarly, under the nationality principle, a State has jurisdiction when the crimes are 
committed by its own nationals, even when committed outside its territory.51 
In the Preamble to the Rome Statute, it is emphasized that ‘the most serious crimes of concern 
to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and…their effective 
prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing 
international cooperation’. It is further stated that it is the duty of every state to exercise its 
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes’.52 Domestic Courts, 
especially the Court of the State where the alleged crime was committed will often be able to 
conduct criminal proceedings more easily, cheaply and quicker than an international tribunal 
would.53 National jurisdiction over the so-called international crimes would take precedence 
over international jurisdiction. This is important to ensure State sovereignty and take advantage 
                                                             
50 Tomuschat C ‘The Duty to Prosecute International Crimes Committed by Individuals’ in Cremer et al, 
Festschrift fur Steinberger (2002) 316. 
51 Brown BS ‘Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and International 
Criminal Tribunals’ (1998) 23 Yale Journal of International Law 391. 
52 Werle G & Jessberger F Principles of International Criminal Law (2014) 79. 
53 Werle & Jessberger (2014) 94. 
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of a decentralized prosecution by States closest to the crime and thus most directly affected by 
it.54 
The duty to prosecute crimes under international law also exists under treaty law for Genocide 
and War Crimes in international armed conflict.55 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their 
first Additional Protocols, Article 5 and 7 of the Torture Convention56 and Article 6 of the 
Genocide Convention57 all clearly provide for the duty of States parties to prosecute treaty 
violations. The ICCPR on the other hand does not contain an explicit provision on this 
obligation. However, the obligation may be construed from the right to an effective remedy 
provided for in Article 2(3), coupled with substantive duties in other provisions, including its 
provision on right to life and the prohibition of torture. 
The UN General Assembly Resolution 3074(XXVIII) of 3 December 1973 provides that 
perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity should be punished. With regards to 
the traditional concept of jurisdiction, ‘*e+very state has the right to try its own nationals for 
war crimes and crimes against humanity’. On the principle of territoriality, it states in the fifth 
paragraph that, ‘*p+ersons against whom there is evidence of commission of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity shall be subject to trial and, if found guilty, to punishment, as a general 
rule in the countries in which they committed those crimes.’58 
                                                             
54 Werle & Jessberger (2014) 95. 
55 Werle & Jessberger (2014) 79. 
56 The Convention against Torture and other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984). 
57 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948). 
58 Principles of international co-operation in the detection, arrest, extradition and punishment of persons 
guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 3074 (XXVIII) 
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It is the duty of the State where violations of international law have been committed or whose 
citizens commit these violations, to investigate and prosecute the alleged offenders. Roht-
Arriaza opines that there are three clauses in modern multilateral human rights treaties which 
support a State’s obligation to investigate egregious human rights violations and take action 
against the parties responsible.59 First, criminal law treaties specify the obligation of States to 
prosecute and punish perpetrators of acts defined as crimes under international law in their 
respective territories. Second, the ‘ensure and respect’ provision common to many treaties 
have been interpreted to impose obligations on States to investigate and prosecute. The third is 
the right to a remedy included in many human rights instruments. This provides a strong basis 
for inferring an obligation to investigate and prosecute. 
It has been stated that States have a wide discretion to act in the exercise of jurisdiction unless 
there is in existence a customary international law norm that is contrary to the exercise of the 
jurisdiction.60  
Although, it is acknowledged that States have the duty to investigate and prosecute acts 
constituting international crimes in their domain, there are certain impediments to the exercise 
of such duty. Inconsistency in the national legislation of the State or lack of adequate national 
legal regime addressing the acts could present a hurdle for national prosecution.61 Where a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
of 3 December 1973. Available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/PersonsGuilty.aspx (Accessed on June 2nd 2015). 
59 Roht-Ariazza N ‘State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations In 
International Law’ (1990) 78 California Law Review 462. 
60 Mack E ‘Does Customary International Law Obligate States to Extradite or Prosecute Individuals Accused 
of Committing Crimes Against Humanity?’ (2015) 24 Minnesota Journal of International Law 78. 
61 Mack (2015) 83. 
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legal regime for crimes under national law simply does not exist, or where there are wide 
disparities in the definition of crimes under international law and the national law of the 
relevant State can be very problematic. Although these problems are vital to the successful 
exercise of national jurisdiction, they are not insurmountable. 
With regards to crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC, a policy paper of the Prosecutor in 
September 2003 stated as follows: 
‘*I+t should... be recalled that the system of complementarity is principally based on the 
recognition that the exercise of national criminal jurisdiction is not only the right but also a duty 
of States. Indeed the principle underlying the concept of complementarity is that the States 
remain responsible and accountable for investigating and prosecuting crimes committed under 
their jurisdiction and that the national systems are expected to maintain and enforce adherence 
to international standards.’62 
The prosecutor concluded that, ‘national investigations and prosecutions, where they can 
properly be undertaken, will be the most effective means of bringing offenders to justice; 
States themselves will normally have the best access to evidence and witnesses.’63 
3.2 Nigeria’s Defence Mechanism: Policing and Judicial System 
Nigeria operates a federal policing system. The Nigerian Police Force is created by section 
214(1) of the Constitution.64 Section 4 and 23 of the Police Act provide for the power to prevent 
                                                             
62 Nouwen SMH ‘Complementarity in the Line of Fire: The Catalysing Effect of the International Criminal 
Court in Uganda and Sudan’ (2013) 37. 
63 Burke-White W ‘Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the 
Rome System of International Justice’ (2008) 49 1 Harvard International Law Journal 68. 
64 ‘There shall be a police force for Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigerian Police Force, and subject to 
the provisions of this section, no other police force shall be established for the federation or any part 
thereof’. Section 214(1) CFRN 1999. 
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commission of crime, apprehend offenders and conduct prosecutions.65 In maintaining security, 
the Nigerian police are empowered to arrest, detain, search, detect and prosecute.66  
Although the police are regarded as the first line of defence, in emergency situations, the 
president, as the commander in chief of the armed forces, has the power to deploy the military 
to intervene in the cases of internal disturbances. The Nigerian military have been very 
instrumental in successfully quelling internal violence in the past. 
Public prosecution is manned by the Ministry of Justice at both the state and the federal levels. 
The Attorney General is the Chief Prosecutor of the state. He is empowered to initiate, conduct, 
take over or discontinue any criminal proceeding in any court of law in the country except in 
the court martial.67  
3.3 Available Legal Regime for Boko Haram acts 
3.3.1 Application of International Treaties 
Most of the acts of Boko Haram like torture, sexual violence of girls and women and other 
similar acts would ordinarily fall under relevant international treaties signed and ratified by 
Nigeria. However, unlike the South African and the Kenyan Constitutions which provide 
expressly for the direct domestic application of ratified international treaties,68 the Nigerian 
                                                             
65 Section 4 Nigerian Police Act Cap. P. 19 LFN 2004. 
66 Babalola A ‘Power of Police to Prosecute Criminal Cases: Nigeria and International Perspectives’ (2014) 2 
European Journal of Business and Social Sciences 132.  
67 Babalola (2014)131. 
68  Section 231(3) & (4) of the South African Constitution is very clear on this matter. Also Section 2(4) & (5) 
of the Kenyan Constitution also provides that general principles of international law are law in Kenya if 
they are not inconsistent with the Kenyan Constitution. 
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Constitution makes provision for a specific hurdle of domestication after ratification, before 
domestic application. Section 12 of the Constitution states that; 
‘*N+o treaty shall have the force of law to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted 
into law by the National Assembly.’ 
This implies that international treaties ratified by Nigeria have to go through the additional law 
making process of enactment before the National Assembly to acquire the force of law in 
Nigeria. The Rome Statute and the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of 
Terrorism among other international treaties have not been domesticated. Therefore, they do 
not have the force of law domestically in Nigeria. However, a brief examination of Nigeria’s 
obligation under both the Rome Statute and the OAU Convention on Prevention and Combating 
of Terrorism is essential. This is because they provide an important basis to address some of the 
Boko Haram acts.  
3.3.1.1 Rome Statute 
Nigeria is a founder member of the ICC having joined the Court at inception in 2002. The 
obligations of Nigeria with regards to the core crimes in the Statute are very clear. Although 
there is no existing duty to domesticate the Rome Statute, it provides that States parties should 
ensure that there are procedures available under their national laws for all forms of 
cooperation with the Court with regards to procedure.69 There have been repeated attempts to 
domesticate the Rome Statute so far unsuccessfully, and as such, commission of crimes in the 
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Statute by Nigerian citizens or on the territory of Nigeria cannot be punishable in Nigeria on the 
basis of the Rome Statute. 
3.3.1.2 The OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999 
The Convention70 was enacted in 1999 and entered into force in 2002. The Convention does not 
define terrorism, but it provides the meaning of terrorist acts.71  It addresses acts that support 
the commission of terrorist acts and the also deals with intent to commit terrorist acts in article 
3(a).72 The Convention creates obligations for States parties to review their national laws and 
establish criminal offences for terrorist acts. It also provides for cooperation, exchange of 
information and extradition of suspects between States parties for the prevention and 
combating of terrorism. Extra-territorial investigation and mutual legal assistance is also 
copiously provided for by the Convention. The Convention additionally enjoins the member 
States to sign related international instruments. The Convention is supplemented by a 
Protocol73which was adopted in Addis Ababa in 2004. The Protocol provides for additional 
commitments on States parties, mechanisms for implementation through the Peace and 
Security Council (PSC) of the African Union, the role of the commission, regional mechanisms 
and issues relating to the settlement of disputes.  
                                                             
70 Also known as the Treaty on Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States in Combating Terrorism, 1999. 
71 Article 1(3) (a) (i-iii) OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999. 
72 Article 1 (3) (b) OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999. 
73 Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 2004. 
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However, the Convention is also not applicable in Nigeria because it has not been 
domesticated. Alternatively, it has provided a relevant platform for the creation of the national 
Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) which is currently in force and patterned after it. 
3.3.2 National Laws 
Under the current legal regime in Nigeria, the first option in dealing with Boko Haram acts is to 
charge them as ordinary crimes in the criminal and penal code such as murder, kidnapping, 
rape and so forth. This approach seems to be inadequate and has not been preferred by the 
prosecutorial authorities. An examination of the definition of the crimes in the criminal and 
penal code shows that they do not in any way capture the severity of the acts of Boko Haram.  
The definition of the offences in the criminal and penal code did not anticipate extreme 
circumstances such as the Boko Haram problem on ground and thus does not provide an 
adequate option. Because of this, the few cases that have been prosecuted have been charged 
on the basis of the Terrorism Prevention Act, a specialised law that adequately addresses 
situations such as the Boko Haram problem. Going forward, recourse has been made to 
terrorism and the terrorism laws only to reflect the internal legal framework with which Nigeria 
deals with the acts of the group. 
Although Nigeria has a copious history with violent acts that could be regarded as terrorism, it 
lacked legislation criminalizing such acts before 2001.  After the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attack in America, attempts were made to enact anti-terrorism provisions in Nigeria. Rather 
than enact new law, the National Assembly included provisions in Section 15 of the Economic 
and Financial Crimes (EFCC) Establishment Act 2004 that define, prohibit and prescribe the 
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punishment for acts that may amount to terrorism.74 As violent acts evolved and increased 
locally, particularly the actions of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
(MEND) in what became known as oil terrorism, and later the Boko Haram group, efforts to 
create an adequate legal framework was resuscitated.75 On January 3, 2010, Nigeria was 
blacklisted by the US Transportation Security Administration (TSA) by classifying it as a country 
of interest on the US Terror Watch List.76 Consequently, two legislations that had been before 
the National Assembly since 2008 were passed. The Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 
(MLPA), which had provisions relating to terrorism financing, and the Terrorism Prevention Act 
(TPA) were signed into law on June 3 2011. 
The Terrorism (Prevention) Act77 is currently the major legal framework that addresses acts that 
may amount to terrorism in Nigeria. It is a very specific law and it makes provisions for acts of 
terrorism without defining terrorism. It criminalizes varied levels of participation in acts that 
may amount to terrorism, including support for terrorism, harbouring of terrorists, terrorism 
financing among other acts incidental and related to the crime. 
 Its provisions relating to prohibition of acts of terrorism in article 1 is an expanded version of 
the provisions in the OAU Convention.  It proscribes any form of terrorist organisation. In the 
same vein, it makes provision for extra territorial application of the Act especially in 
strengthening the combating of terrorism financing offences. It further empowers the Attorney 
                                                             
74 Sampson IT & Onuoha FC ‘Forcing the Horse to Drink or Making It Realize its Thirst’? Understanding the 
Enactment of Anti-Terrorism Legislation (ATL) in Nigeria’ (2011) 5 Perspectives on Terrorism 38. 
75 Sampson & Onuoha (2011) 40. 
76 Sampson & Onuoha (2011) 41. 
77 Terrorism Prevention Act, Act No 10, 2011. 
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General of the Federation to institute and undertake criminal proceedings in addition to the 
responsibility of the law enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute acts that fall under 
the TPA.78 The Federal High Court is vested with sole jurisdiction to impose penalties specified 
in the Act.79 The Act provides for long prison terms depending on the level of involvement of 
the accused and where death occurs as a result of the terrorist act, the accused may be 
sentenced to life imprisonment.80 The TPA (Amendment) Act (2013) which amends the TPA 
(2011) makes provision for monetary fines, terms of imprisonment and introduces a maximum 
sentence of death penalty for offences under the Act.81 It also introduces the criminalisation of 
inchoate terrorism offences like incitement to commit and inducement to commit terrorism 
offenses.82 Currently, all the Boko Haram related cases (five major cases are on record) that 
have been charged to Court have been on the basis of the Terrorism Prevention Act.83 A major 
challenge with this Act however, is that it cannot be applied to crimes that were committed 
before 2011 and 2013 respectively.  
Currently, it is unclear how many Boko Haram members are in custody. According to the US 
Department of State report, in 2013, a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) set up by the Nigerian 
Defence Headquarters recommended for immediate trial over 500 Boko Haram suspects in 
custody, release of 167 detainees and a review of 614 inconclusive cases. Speculations are rife 
however that the military has in custody thousands of people arrested in connection with the 
                                                             
78 Section 30 (1-2) TPA. 
79 Section 32 (1) TPA. 
80 Section 33 (e) TPA. 
81 Section 2(2) (h) TPA (Amendment) Act. 
82 Section 2(2) (h) TPA (Amendment) Act. 
83 US Department of State Bureau of Counter-terrorism Country Reports on Terrorism 2013. Available at 
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group.  Not much has been heard with regards to the investigation and the prosecution of these 
individuals. 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
The response of Nigeria to the Boko Haram violence has been explored in this chapter. It also 
provided an analysis of the responsibility of Nigeria to prosecute international crimes 
committed in its territory. It further highlighted Nigeria’s policing and judicial system as it 
relates to the Boko Haram violence and tackled the legal responses particularly of the Terrorism 
Prevention Act and the application of related international conventions and instruments as a 
response to the Boko Haram group.  Domestically, the option of dealing with the Boko Haram 
crimes as crimes under the Terrorism Prevention Act is available and may be utilised to 
prosecute suspects in custody. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: Potential for the Intervention of the ICC 
4.1 Why the ICC Should Intervene in Nigeria 
The ICC commenced preliminary investigation into the Nigerian situation in 2013.84 This is 
inclusive of the Boko Haram and other crisis in the country. Of the crisis being investigated, 
Boko Haram is the only one that remains an active problem. There have been calls by members 
of the civil society for the investigation and prosecution of suspected senior members of the 
Boko Haram hierarchy in the custody of Nigeria by the ICC.  Therefore, a consideration of the 
potential advantages of the intervention of the ICC for Boko Haram is essential. 
4.1.1 Neutrality, Impartiality and Judicial Prejudice 
Potentially, assuming Nigeria shows readiness to prosecute the Boko Haram suspects in 
custody, a major concern as expressed by civil society is the neutrality and impartiality of the 
judges who would potentially adjudicate over the cases in Nigeria. The Boko Haram situation is 
one that continues to receive a high level of publicity in Nigeria daily. This has led to a situation 
where supposed membership or mere sympathy with the ideals of the organisation generates a 
feeling of disgust in the general populace. It is doubtful whether the suspects have any chance 
of a fair trial before a Nigerian Court. This is because anyone suspected to be affiliated to the 
group is already presumed overwhelmingly guilty in the court of public opinion. The 
presumption of innocence is provided for in Article 11(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human 
                                                             
84 Preliminary Examination before the Court Available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and
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Rights and other universal and regional human rights instruments.85 A major pillar of the 
presumption of innocence rule is the fairness of a trial in a substantive and procedural way.86 
All the rights of the accused must be respected and protected before and during the trial. 
Article 66(1) of the Rome Statute also makes this clear provision. The European Court of Human 
Rights addressed the presumption of innocence as follows: 
‘*I+t requires, inter alia, that when carrying out their duties, the members of a court should not 
start with a preconceived idea that the accused has committed the offence charged; the burden 
of proof is on the prosecution, and any doubt should benefit the accused...’87 
Trial in Nigeria may result in a situation of bias against the suspects and a lack of fair trial. It is 
important to avoid this as justice must not only be done; it must be seen as been done.88 If a 
judicial process must be respected, it must be perceived as fair.89 
4.2. Complementarity Requirement; a Bar to ICC Intervention? 
Article 1 of the ICC Statute provide that the Court ‘shall be a permanent institution and shall 
have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of 
international concern....and shall be complementary to national jurisdictions.’90 Although the 
ICC provides the forum where major perpetrators of international crimes are held responsible 
                                                             
85 Provisions in other Human Rights Instruments include: Art 14(2) International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1976), Art 7(2) the American Convention on Human Rights (1978), Art 6(2) European 
Convention on Human Rights (1955), Art 7(1) (b) African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1986), 
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at the international level,91 realistically, direct enforcement of international criminal law 
through international Courts will continue to be the exception rather than the rule.92 The Rome 
Statute applies the principle of complementarity to its relationship with national jurisdictions. 
Even for core crimes, international law does not replace national jurisdiction but it is meant to 
supplement it.93 Under the ICC mode, complementarity enables States parties to prosecute 
cases on their own in the first instance, and consequently protecting their sovereign rights to 
deal with cases before their domestic systems. National courts enjoy primacy of jurisdiction 
except under special circumstances where the ICC is entitled to take over and assert its 
jurisdiction.94 This is similar to the system adopted by international human right bodies where a 
petitioner is mandated to exhaust domestic remedies.95 Complementarity while not expressly 
mentioned in the Rome Statute is elucidated clearly in Article 17.  Paragraph 1 suggests that 
there are four criteria to be examined before the question of complementarity is determined. 
First, whether the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State that has jurisdiction; 
second, whether a State has investigated and concluded that there is no basis on which to 
prosecute; third, whether the accused has already been tried for the conduct; and finally, 
whether the case is of insufficient gravity to be brought before the Court.96 In the Lubanga 
decision,97 the Pre-Trial chamber addressed the complementarity requirement as set out in Art 
                                                             
92 Ludwin King EB ‘Big Fish, Small Ponds: International Crimes in National Courts’ (2015) 90 Indiana Law 
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17(1) (a)-(c) in a two-fold manner. The first is that there is a requirement to check whether the 
State has taken action that satisfies Art 17(1) (a)-(c). In this context, not every investigation 
carried out by a State would be sufficient.98 The second test applies when there already exist 
proceedings before the national courts, and there is a need to determine the quality of such 
proceedings. In this context, only the ‘unwillingness’ or ‘inability’ determination may be 
applied.99 Where a State with jurisdiction over the case may have been investigating or 
prosecuting, the case may still be deemed admissible if it is proven that the State is ‘unwilling’ 
or ‘unable’ to carry out ‘genuine’ investigation and prosecution.100 The criteria of unwillingness 
or inability do not always have to be both present. This is based on an interpretation of the 
wording of Art 17(1) (b) and the use of the conjunction ‘or’. The presence of one of the two 
should be sufficient. Genuineness has been described as mostly similar to the concept of good 
faith and thus not a criterion independent of unwillingness or inability.101 However, its presence 
raises the threshold of objective scrutiny in testing the quality of States’ national proceeding.102 
A careful reading of the provision would show that it is only when domestic investigations 
and/or prosecutions have been or are being conducted would it be necessary to determine 
unwillingness, inability and genuineness. The ICC Appeals Chamber in the Katanga Admissibility 
Judgement stated as follows: 
‘[I]n considering whether a case is inadmissible under Article 17(1) (a) and (b) of the Statute, the 
initial questions to ask are (1) whether there are ongoing investigations or prosecutions, or 
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(2)whether there have been investigations in the past, and the State having jurisdiction has 
decided not to prosecute the person concerned. It is only when the answers to these questions 
are in the affirmative that one has to look to the second- halves of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) 
and to examine the question of unwillingness and inability...’103 
At this point, it is important to consider the actions that have been taken so far by the Nigerian 
authority. This would assist in an assessment of unwillingness or inability to genuinely 
investigate and prosecute Boko Haram suspects in custody. This is important to determine 
whether the complementarity regime will be a bar to the intervention of the ICC in the Boko 
Haram situation in Nigeria. 
4.2.1 The Criterion of Unwillingness 
Article 17(2) provides three conditions where unwillingness may be said to exist. According to 
the provisions, the presence of one or more would suffice. The first condition is when 
proceedings are being undertaken to shield the person concerned from criminal responsibility. 
It has been stated that this is the most subjective ground of unwillingness because it entails an 
enquiry into the intent of a State.104 This does not seem to be relevant to the Nigerian condition 
as there is no evidence to suggest that the Boko Haram suspects in custody are being shielded 
from criminal responsibility.  
The second criteria relates to unjustified delay in the proceedings inconsistent with an intention 
to being the person to justice. This seems to be a more objective requirement.105 Nouwen 
opines that the absence of the intent to bring to justice need not be positively proven, but can 
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be inferred from an unjustified delay or lack of impartiality and independence seemingly 
inconsistent with such an intent.106 It has been stated that in other to determine Article 17(2) 
(b), three questions have to be answered. The first is whether there has been a delay in the 
proceedings; the second is whether such a delay was unjustified; and, third, whether such an 
unjustified delay was in the circumstance of the situation or case accompanied by the intention 
not to bring the person concerned to justice.107 The question remains that if it may be proven 
that there was an unjustified delay in the process, would this not generate a presumption that 
the State involved did not intend to bring the suspects concerned to justice? El Zeidy opines 
that ‘the language of Article 17(2)(b)  is not designed to address delays that touch upon the 
individual rights of the accused strictly, but rather to address delay relating to the entire 
criminal process; that is a delay that directly impacts on the idea of bringing an accused to 
justice’.108 Although there has been no strict time limits provided for what constitutes delay, 
the idea of reasonableness should come into play. In Ratiani v. Georgia,109 the Human Rights 
Committee stated that what constitutes undue delay depends on the circumstances of each 
case. Since 2009, hundreds of people have been detained in Nigeria without investigation and 
prosecution.110 In this instance, the criterion of unjustified delay would be appropriate in 
relation to this condition. Nigeria’s law enforcement and investigation mechanism is available 
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para.10.7.  
110 Amnesty International Report ‘Stars on their Shoulders, Blood on their Hands; War Crimes Committed by 
the Nigerian Military’ 2 June 2015. 
Amnesty International Report ‘Nigeria: Horror in Numbers’ June 3, 2015. Available at 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/06/nigeria-horror-in-numbers/(accessed on July 16, 
2015). 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
and  fully functional, the judiciary has not in any way been disabled by the crisis and the 
government currently been said to have in custody hundreds of Boko Haram suspects including 
some of their higher ranking officers. Under the Nigerian law, the crimes committed are federal 
crimes and directly under the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. The cases may be 
adjudicated in any Federal High Court in any of the unaffected regions in the country. There 
were five recorded and highly publicised prosecutions in 2013. Since then, there have been no 
available data relating to any significant action been taken to investigate and prosecute 
hundreds (or thousands) of suspects in custody.111 If lack of ‘an intent to bring the persons 
concerned to justice’ can be inferred from an unjustified delay, then the second criteria would 
have been fulfilled and in my opinion, the ‘unwillingness’ requirement has been met. 
The third condition relates to the circumstance when proceedings were not or are not being 
conducted independently or impartially. It is very clear that this criterion is not relevant to the 
Nigerian circumstance. 
4.2.2 The Criterion of Inability 
Article 17(3) addresses the criterion of inability. This has been described as an objective 
element.112 Inability can be inferred from the lack of capacity of a State to investigate and 
prosecute resulting from social disturbance, natural disaster, chaos resulting from a civil war, or 
the unavailability of an effective judicial system that is proficient to guarantee a full and 
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effective domestic criminal process.113 Article 17(3) contains three elements that underlie the 
criterion of inability. They are; inability of the State to secure the custody of the accused; 
inability of the State to gather the necessary evidence and testimony; and the inability of the 
State to otherwise conduct the proceedings in situations other than the inability to obtain the 
accused or the necessary evidence. The Court stated in the Admissibility Decision Bemba114 that 
in determining inability, the causes and consequences of inability to investigate and prosecute 
shall be considered. In this vein, the jurisdiction of the ICC may come into play only when it 
identifies a deficiency in the State organs, resulting from a breakdown of State judicial 
institutions, or widespread anarchy.115 Certain normative factors can also render a system 
unavailable to genuinely investigate and prosecute.116 Examples include the application of 
amnesty or immunity laws, lack of necessary extradition treaties, absence of jurisdiction under 
domestic law including other foreseeable factors. It has been stated that States with fully 
functional criminal justice systems can also be found ‘unable’, provided that, in the particular 
case, the system is unavailable genuinely to conduct proceedings.117 
With relation to the criterion established in Article 17(3), it is apparent that in the first instance, 
Nigeria is not unable to secure the custody of the suspects. On different occasions, self-
confessed senior members of Boko Haram have been arrested by the Nigerian authorities in 
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combat; some have also surrendered to the authorities of their own accord.118 With regards to 
inability to gather necessary evidence and testimony, it is unclear whether this is really a 
problem for the Nigerian authorities. Usually, whenever a major attack occurs, the first people 
on the scene are usually the police and the relevant authorities. Except for areas where there 
have been actual combat on territory, this cannot be raised as a legitimate problem. For 
prosecution, the crimes in question are federal crimes and cases can be instituted in any 
Federal High Court in the remaining unaffected five regions of Nigeria. The Courts are available, 
there is no shortage of the relevant personnel and the Nigerian legal system as a whole is 
largely unaffected by the violence in the north-east. It is my opinion therefore that Nigeria 
cannot be said to be unable to investigate and prosecute Boko Haram members in custody 
based on the provisions in the Rome Statute.  
4.3. An Assessment of Boko Haram acts as Crimes against humanity 
The provisions of Article 7 of the Rome Statute deal exclusively with crimes against humanity. 
The crime is said to occur when any of the acts specified in Article 7(1) are committed as a part 
of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.  
Crimes against humanity are particularly odious offences that constitute a serious attack on 
human dignity and a grave humiliation or degradation of persons.119 
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 4.4.1 The Nature of the Attack (Contextual Element) 
A critical basic requirement is that the commission of any of the individual acts must be 
widespread or systematic,120 and the perpetrator must have knowledge that the actions are 
part of a widespread or systematic attack.121 For crimes against humanity, the Rome Statute 
excludes any nexus to armed conflict.122 It is not clear whether the condition of ‘widespread or 
systematic’ is cumulative or disjunctive. A widespread or systematic attack against a 
fundamental human right also constitutes a threat to peace in a broader sense, encompassing 
the security and well being of the world.123 The attack in question must be intended to violate 
the protected human rights of a civilian population. The widespread or systematic character of 
the attack can relate to the extension of the attacks over a broad geographical area or the 
number of victims involved.124 An attack was deemed widespread because it ‘affected hundreds 
of thousands of individuals and took place across wide swathes of the territory of the Darfur 
region’.125 It must be ‘massive, frequent, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness 
and directed against a multiplicity of victim’.126 An attack was held to be systematic because, ‘it 
lasted for well over five years and the acts of violence of which it was comprised followed, to a 
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considerable extent, a similar pattern’.127 The widespread requirement is measured 
quantitatively.  
The Boko Haram attacks have been carried out on a regular basis since 2009 and have resulted 
in the death of thousands, injury of hundreds of thousands and the displacement of hundreds 
of thousands of citizens. They have also been carried out across a large area of the territory of 
north-eastern Nigeria with regular incursions into Niger, northern Cameroon and Chad.128 The 
manner in which Boko Haram attacks have been carried out also points to the widespread and 
systematic element. Most of the Boko Haram attacks have been carried out with sophisticated 
weapons, perpetrators usually dressed in military uniforms with bullet proof and executed in an 
organised manner. Many of the attacks have been described as well orchestrated and executed 
with precision and expertise.129  
4.4.2 The Policy Element 
 Article 7(2) (a) describe attack as the multiple commission of the individual acts ‘pursuant to or 
in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack’. This provision has 
generated a lot of debate in recent times. Werle & Jessberger opine that the policy in question 
need not be explicit or clearly and precisely stipulated, nor is it necessary that it be decided 
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upon at the highest levels.130 The important factor is that the actual aim of the policy is an 
attack on a civilian population. The presence of a policy element can be inferred from the 
totality of the circumstances including actual events, political platforms or writings, public 
statements or propaganda programmes, including the creation of an administrative structure. 
The body responsible for the policy must be specific namely a State or an organization. A State 
can be viewed in a functional sense which could include relatively stable entities that control 
areas de facto.131 An organization on the other hand, may include groups of persons that 
govern a specific territory or are have the ability to do so. One must note that the crucial factor 
is not the internal structure of the group, but its potential, to commit a widespread and 
systematic attack on a civilian population.132 According to the Pre- Trial Chamber 11 of the ICC, 
‘such a policy may be made by a group of persons who govern a specific territory or by any 
organization with the capability to commit a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian 
population. The policy need not be formalized.’133 The Pre-Trial Chamber 1 in Katanga stated 
that, ‘an attack which is planned, directed or organized-as opposed to spontaneous or isolated 
acts of violence’ would satisfy this criterion.134 
The attacks of Boko Haram have been targeted at a civilian population. Initially, the violence 
was directed at Christians and anyone who did not share their beliefs. This is apparent in the 
fact that the earliest targets of the group were churches. Later, the group began to attack 
general areas such as markets, transportation systems, educational facilities and office 
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buildings. These attacks are usually carried out in areas that are not viewed as being ‘Muslim 
enough’.135 The group has repeatedly communicated its policies through public broadcasts and 
videos while taking responsibility for the latest attack and pressing its demands to the 
government. The group has declared an Islamic caliphate, declared that western education is 
sinful and attacks educational institutions at all levels, attacked government installations, and 
religious organisations that do not subscribe to their beliefs severally.136 Although the 
administrative structure of the group is unknown, it is clear that it has the potential to commit a 
widespread and systematic attack, and it has controlled a large expanse of land de facto in 
Borno, Yobe and Adamawa state.137 
4.4.3 Commission of individual acts 
With relation to the commission of crimes against humanity, the elements of crimes include the 
commission of one of the acts stated in Article 7(1) within the appropriate context. According to 
Cassese, such acts must cause or consist of murder, great suffering, serious injury to body, 
mental or physical health; or take the form of torture, rape, or even enforced disappearance of 
persons.138 The acts in question include murder,139 extermination,140 enslavement,141 
                                                             
135 Human Rights Watch Report ‘Those Terrible Weeks in Their Camp Boko Haram Violence against Women 
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deportation or forcible transfer of population,142 Imprisonment,143 Torture,144 Rape, sexual 
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization and any other form of 
sexual violence of comparable gravity,145 persecution,146 enforced disappearance of persons,147 
apartheid,148 and a catch all category of any other inhumane act of similar character.149 With 
the exception of the crime of apartheid, almost all the listed crimes can be proven to have been 
committed by the Boko Haram group in Nigeria. The group has killed thousands of men, women 
and children, under different circumstances. Girls have been kidnapped from schools, while 
boys are murdered in cold blood. Girls and women have been kidnapped and forced to serve as 
sex slaves and provide domestic services for the fighters. There are allegations of an active 
slave market where kidnapped individuals are sold by some who managed to escape from their 
camps. Also, the group has persecuted and forced many to convert to Islam with those who 
refuse murdered for their faith.150 
 4.4.4 Civilian Population 
The ambit of crimes against humanity covers any civilian population as stipulated in Article 7(1). 
The victims may be all encompassing as targets are usually non-discriminatory.151 A civilian 
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population has been described as any group of people with shared characteristics which makes 
it the target of an attack.152 A civilian population refers to any group bound by nationality, 
ethnicity, religion, political affiliations or other identifiable characteristics.153 Such shared 
characteristics may be as mundane as a geographical location. Most of the target of the Boko 
Haram group is based on religious affiliations; by attacking religious organisations, educational 
status; attack on schools and educational facilities; government installations, transportation 
facilities and anything/any group of people regarded as ‘western’.  
4.4.5 Nexus Requirement 
There must be a link between the act perpetrated by the accused and the attack directed 
against a civilian population. This implies that the acts must be in furtherance of the 
widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population.154 Under some circumstances, a 
single act can constitute a crime against humanity when it is committed within the overall 
context, but an isolated act cannot.155 A consistent factor in all of the acts of Boko Haram is that 
the group is quick to take responsibility for the attack in a public broadcast.156 This fits the 
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individual acts into the overall pattern of the acts of the group. In each of such broadcast, the 
group further reiterates its policy and threatens further action in other to achieve its aim. 
4.4.6 Mental Element 
The mens rea element of the act is knowledge as provided for in Article 7(1). This is reflective of 
Article 30 which relates to general provisions for mental element for crimes in the Statute. An 
accused person that lacks knowledge cannot be found guilty of crimes against humanity. With 
regard to Boko Haram, one can conclude that the perpetrators have knowledge of the context 
in which they attack the civilian population. However, it is necessary that each individual case is 
investigated to further establish this point. 
 4.5. Boko Haram acts as War Crimes 
War crimes are violations of a rule of international humanitarian law creating direct criminal 
responsibility under international law.157 It extends to both international and internal armed 
conflict. It can also be described as the criminal violation of the rules of international 
humanitarian law. International humanitarian law has to a large extent attained the character 
of customary international law. The distinct nature of war crimes is that it is based on a 
violation of a rule of international humanitarian law that is established either by treaty or under 
customary international law.158 
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 4.5.1 Existence of an Armed Conflict 
An important element of war crimes as provided for in Article 8 is the existence of an armed 
conflict. This is essential to contextualise the acts in question as a major distinction in 
determining whether such acts would be regarded as war crimes or not.159 As provided for in 
Article 8(2) (a) with regards to the grave breaches of the Geneva Convention, the jurisprudence 
of the ICTY is that the acts must be committed in the context of an international armed conflict 
against persons or property protected under the four Geneva Conventions.160 The ICTY Appeals 
Chamber defined armed conflict as follows:  
‘*W]e find that an armed conflict exists whenever there is resort to armed force between States 
or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups 
or between such groups within a State.’161 
Whether the armed conflict is international or non-international, there must be a nexus 
between the acts of the perpetrator and the armed conflict as the laws of war crimes may only 
be applied to armed conflict. A typical armed conflict scenario could be inter-state, intra- state 
or transnational conflict.162 Transnational conflict is waged between State armed forces and 
non-State armed groups or between non-State groups, but take place on the territory of more 
than one State.163 
 
                                                             
159 Schabas (2010)199. 
160 Dormann K, Doswald-Beck L & Kolb R ‘Elements of War Crimes Under the Rome Statute of the 
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4.5.2 Character of Armed Conflict 
The distinction between conflicts of an international or a non-international character is 
important to determine the legal regime applicable to the conflict. Conventionally, non-
international armed conflicts have been addressed as a domestic matter. Conflicts between 
government forces and other armed groups or between armed groups that take place within 
the territory of a single State can qualify as non- international armed conflict. It is necessary 
however, that such conflict achieves a certain degree of organisation.164 Although the Rome 
Statute does not define what an international armed conflict is, Art 8(2) (a)-(b) relates directly 
to war crimes of an international character while Art 8(2) (c) deals with the case of an armed 
conflict not of an international character. In this distinction, Article 8(2) (a) adopts the rules on 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. Article 8(2) (b) addresses ‘other serious violations 
of the laws and customs of war’, while Article 8(2) (c) contains the crimes found in the Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Article 8(2) (e) deals with acts arising from sources other 
than the Geneva Conventions and applicable in non-international armed conflict. Article 8(2) (d) 
governs the crimes described in Article 8(2) (c) and does not apply to ‘situations of internal 
disturbances and tensions such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence, or other acts of a 
similar nature’.165 The Pre-trial Chamber II in Bemba stated that, ‘non-international armed 
conflict is characterised by the outbreak of an armed nature, but which takes place within the 
confine of a States territory. The hostilities may break out (i) between government authorities 
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and organized dissident armed groups, or (ii) between such groups.’166 In Lubanga, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber I interpreted Article 8(2)(f) and focused on the ability of the armed group in question 
to plan and carry out military operations for a prolonged period of time.167 Article 8(2) (f) 
requires that the conflict be protracted. This is essentially an indication of the intensity of the 
conflict. It is important to note that the law of war crimes would come to play in a conflict not 
of an international character if the intra-State conflict is comparable to an inter-State conflict. 
This may be the case if the parties are highly organised, have the ability to control the 
belligerents connected with it regardless of whether State troops are involved in the conflict.168 
The legal classification of the Boko Haram conflict in this instance would depend on many 
factors. However, it is important to note that the violence in this instant has been protracted 
and consistent since 2009, and the group may be regarded as being sufficiently organised. The 
ICRC commentary on ‘Common Article 3’ highlights the following conditions in the 
determination of the applicability and the existence of an internal armed conflict: 
‘*a]) Party in revolt should have: an organized military force; an authority responsible for its acts 
within a specific territory; and means of ensuring compliance with the convention.  
 
b) The dejure government is forced to resort to use of military force against the insurgents who 
are organised as military in possession of part of the State‘s territory.  
c) The dejure government recognized the insurgents as belligerents or accorded them such 
recognition for the purposes of the convention; the insurgents claimed the right to be treated as 
belligerents.  
d) The UN Security Council or General Assembly has acknowledged the dispute as posing a 
threat to international peace.’169 
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Violations of international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflict can 
also entail criminal responsibility under customary international law. Under the ICC Statute and 
in accordance with customary international law, the protection of persons in non-international 
armed conflict is comparable, albeit narrower, to their protection in an international armed 
conflict.170 
In the Nigerian scenario, the parties to the armed conflict are known and there have been 
sustained and concerted military operations between the Boko Haram fighters and the Nigerian 
military. It is not clear however, how to classify the acts of Boko Haram. Initially when the 
attacks started in 2009, they targeted Nigerian cities and citizens. Gradually, the group began 
sporadic incursions into border areas of neighbouring West African States; Niger, Chad and 
Cameroon. Currently, attacks, killings and kidnappings in the three countries have almost 
become as frequent as those in the north-eastern Nigeria.171 The Nigerian military have been 
engaging with the Boko Haram fighters within Nigeria on the one hand.  Also, the Multinational 
Joint Task Force (MNJTF) set up by the AU to aid the Nigerian military also comprises of forces 
from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger. The group has also been consistent in its incursions 
and attacks of border areas of Chad, Niger and northern Cameroon. This makes it very difficult 
to state categorically whether the context in question is of an international or a non-
international character. 
                                                             
170 Werle & Jessberger (2014) 408. 
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4.5.3 Nexus between the Individual Act and the Armed Conflict 
The conduct must take place in the context of and associated with an armed conflict.172 Also, 
war crimes may be committed outside the areas of actual combat if it exhibits a close 
connection to the armed conflict.173 In this vein, there must be a functional relationship 
between the conduct in question and the armed conflict. In Nigeria, information relating to the 
actual engagements of Boko Haram with the Nigeria military on the front is very scant. 
However, the looting of villages, bomb attacks, summary executions of civilians and the 
destruction of properties that happen alongside is noteworthy. Most of the conducts 
complained of have taken place in close connection with ongoing military engagement in many 
instances.174 
4.5.4 Protected Interest and Persons 
The law of war crimes protects fundamental individual rights during armed conflicts.175 Many of 
the grave breaches provision in Article 8(2) (a) employ the expression ‘protected person’. It is 
required in the prosecution of the war crimes to ascertain that the victim was a protected 
person. In the situation of an armed conflict, protected persons are exposed to specific dangers.  
Under international law, the distinction between lawful and unlawful conduct is primarily 
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174 May 8, 2013 ‘Nigeria at War’ Available at http://newsrescue.com/nigeria-at-war/#axzz3p9Z44foF 
(Accessed on October 10, 2015). 
May 17, 2013 ‘Boko Haram Members May Face War Crimes Charges’ Available at 
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un.html (Accessed on October 10, 2015).   
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decided by a consideration of the victims of the acts in question.176 With relation to Article 
8(2)(c) of the Rome Statute, the notion of protected person was not employed, rather victims 
were described as ‘persons taking no active part in hostilities, including armed forces who have 
laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any 
other cause’. With relation to an international armed conflict, victims of the grave breaches of 
the Conventions must be wounded or sick (Geneva Conventions I and II Article 13), shipwrecked 
(Geneva Convention II Article 13), those who have fallen in the hands of the enemy (Geneva 
Convention III Article 4A) and Prisoners of War.177 The fourth Geneva Convention in Article 4(1) 
protects those in the hands of a hostile party or located in the territory that such hostile party 
controls.178 In an internal armed conflict, the provisions of the Common Article 3(1) o f the 
Geneva Conventions provide protection for those who do not take part in hostilities, members 
of the armed forces who have laid down their arms or placed hors de combat. The same 
position is adopted in Article 8(2) (c) of the Rome Statute. The most important factor is that the 
victim did not participate directly in hostilities at the time of the commission of the crimes.179 
Most of the acts of the Boko Haram group have specifically targeted unarmed citizens who have 
not been involved in any way in the hostilities between the group and the government forces. 
These citizens have been killed, wounded, abducted and properties have been looted and 
destroyed. 
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4.5.5 Mental Element 
The perpetrator must be aware of the circumstances that establish the character of the conflict. 
Knowledge of the existence of the armed conflict by the accused is a very essential element of 
the crime.  According to Schabas; ‘there is a requirement for the awareness of the factual 
circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict that is implicit in the terms: 
took place in the context of and associated with’.180 The alleged perpetrator must be aware of 
the factual circumstances that establish the existence of the armed conflict. Knowledge is an 
important component of the mental element of crimes in the Rome Statute particularly in 
Article 30 and 32. 
4.5.6 Individual Acts 
Article 8 being the longest provision in the Rome Statute divides war crimes into four broad 
categories. Two categories are applicable to international armed conflict and the other two 
applicable to non-international armed conflict. With relation to the Boko Haram violence, some 
of the relevant punishable acts include the following: wilful killing, murder,181 torture,182 cruel 
or inhuman treatment,183 causing great suffering,184 taking hostages,185 attacking civilians,186 
attacking civilian objects,187 among other prohibited acts provided for in Article 8. 
                                                             
180 Schabas (2010) 209. 
181 Article 8(2) (a) (i), article 8(2) (c) (i). 
182 Article 8(2) (a) (ii), 8(2) (c) (i). 
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4.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter addressed the prospect of ICC intervention in Nigeria by examining the potential 
neutrality and the independence of full scale prosecution of Boko Haram suspects in custody 
before Nigerian Courts. It further examined the complementarity regime of the ICC to 
understand whether the Court is in a position to intervene in Nigeria. Finally, this chapter 
compared the acts in question to the provisions of Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes in 
the Rome Statute to understand whether the required threshold has been met. It concluded 
with regards to crimes against humanity that the acts of Boko Haram meet the threshold 
requirements. However, for war crime, in the first instance, it is not clear whether the conflict 
in question is of an internal or an international character. Nevertheless, this does not stop the 
ICC from intervening as the other elements of war crimes have been shown to be present in the 
acts of Boko Haram. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: Other Possible Responses to the Boko Haram Violence 
The reluctance of the Nigerian authorities to investigate and prosecute and the challenges 
relating to a potential ICC intervention has made the consideration of other possible alternative 
responses to the Boko Haram violence imperative. Hence, this chapter looks into other possible 
responses aside from domestic prosecution and the option of the intervention of the ICC, for 
the investigation and prosecution and consequently the resolution of the Boko Haram violence. 
5.1 Prosecution under the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction 
The principle of universal jurisdiction takes over from territoriality and personality, and permits 
States with no nexus to the crime or the alleged offender to prosecute for the crimes in 
question.188 It provides States with jurisdiction over a category of offences recognised as 
offences of universal concern, regardless of where they are committed, who commits and 
against whom they are committed.189 The universality principle grants domestic jurisdiction for 
crimes under international law to States. The principle presumes that every State has an 
interest to exercise jurisdiction to combat crimes which has been condemned universally. The 
State in question acts without the delegation of jurisdiction to it by the State directly linked to 
the crime, or by the international community at large.190 Randall argues that the ambit of 
universal jurisdiction has expanded significantly, from traditional crimes like piracy and slave 
trading, to include terrorism, apartheid, torture and other human rights violations.191 An 
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American district court in 1981, while prosecuting a terrorist act in Guyana noted that ‘nations 
have begun to extend universal jurisdiction to crimes considered in the modern era to be as 
great a threat to the wellbeing of the international community as piracy’.192 In the Eichmann 
trial in Jerusalem, while explaining the basis for Israel’s jurisdiction, the district Court stated 
that: 
‘*T+he State of Israel’s ‘right to punish’ the accused derives, in our view from two cumulative 
sources: first, a universal source (pertaining to the whole of mankind), which vests the right to 
prosecute and punish crimes of this order in every State within the family of nations....’193 
The judgement demonstrates the legitimacy of universal jurisdiction over war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. The Supreme Court of Israel in its judgement further stated: 
‘*T+here is full justification for applying here the principle of universal jurisdiction since the 
international character of crimes against humanity dealt with in this case is no longer in doubt... 
Not only do all the crimes attributed to the appellant bear an international character, their 
harmful and murderous effects were so embracing and widespread to shake the international 
community to its very foundations.’194 
The basic premise of universal jurisdiction is the interest of every State to bring perpetrators of 
crimes of international concern to justice. Also, these States must have jurisdiction to be able to 
deal with the crimes under their domestic legal regimes. According to Randall, terrorists and 
human rights offenders are comparable to pirates, slave traders and war criminals. This is 
because their offences involve reprehensible acts that often indiscriminately endanger human 
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lives and property interests.195 The unilateral application of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction can be justified when exercised in the first instance, in a manner to avoid interfering 
in another States affair and with the intention of making it difficult for the perpetrator to go 
unpunished.196 The ICTY in Furudnzija, in considering the nature of prohibition against torture, 
stated that the erga omnes obligation of preventing torture is derived from jus cogens which 
give rise to an absolute universal jurisdiction. The Court further stated that all those who 
commit the act of torture are considered as hostis humani generis, which is enemy of all 
mankind.197 This implies that all States have the responsibility to punish such offenders if found. 
The logical question to ask is whether the Boko Haram acts have reached the threshold to be 
regarded as crimes that threaten the wellbeing of the international community. Therefore, a 
consideration of the application of universal jurisdiction for Boko Haram crimes is essential.  
5.1.2 Application of Universal Jurisdiction for the Crimes of Boko Haram  
In the previous chapters, the acts of Boko Haram have been addressed as amounting to crimes 
against humanity and war crimes under the ICC Statute and the crime of terrorism under 
Nigerian law.  Because of this, in discussing the universal character, the acts in question will be 
addressed in a two-fold manner. In the first instance, they will be dealt with as core crimes in 
the ICC Statute (crimes against humanity and war crimes) and secondly as the crime of 
terrorism under Nigerian law.  
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To invoke universal jurisdiction, certain hurdles have to be crossed. A major hurdle is the 
presence of the suspect in the territory of the third-party State and the issue of double 
criminality. On the presence of the suspect in the territory of the by-stander State, this goes 
without saying. Despite the absence of territoriality and nationality, the third State does not 
prosecute without a sufficient link to the crime. The sufficient link would be the presence of the 
suspect in its territory. With regard to double criminality, the offence in question must be 
criminal under the laws of the requested State and under the laws of the territory of the 
offence (the lex locus delicti) and the State must possess the appropriate legal regime for 
dealing with the crime in question.198 This is a fundamental requirement.  With regards to Boko 
Haram acts, the premise of this argument is that for instance, if some key members of the 
group are captured in any of the neighbouring countries, they should be able to investigate and 
prosecute them on their territory. This would be without regard to the fact that the majority of 
the crimes complained of were actually committed in Nigeria.  Most of the neighbouring 
countries to Nigeria have ratified the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of 
Terrorism and are also parties to the Rome Statute. This implies that on a simplistic level, they 
possess the basic legal framework to deal with the crimes. In this hypothetical scenario, if 
senior members of Boko Haram flee to Niger and are arrested, chances are that if such persons 
are extradited and handed over to the Nigerian authorities, it is unlikely that they will be 
prosecuted in a timely fashion, if prosecuted at all. In this instance, universal jurisdiction may 
be an option that can be utilised in other to allow Niger to prosecute the suspects and ensure 
that the crimes committed do not go unpunished. 
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5.1.2.1 Application of Universal Jurisdiction for Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes 
To determine the jus cogens status of an international crime, factors to consider include: the 
historical legal evolution of the crime, the number of States that have outlawed the crime at 
the national level, the number of prosecutions based on the crime and their 
characterisations.199 It is noted however, that not all jus cogens crimes consist of all the stated 
elements at the same time. For instance, although certain acts may threaten the peace and 
security of the international community, their gravity may depend on the context of their 
occurrence and the nature of the crimes committed. The status of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity as crimes in which the international community have a collective legal 
interest is without question.200 This is apparent from an observation of the evolution of the 
crimes, the national jurisdictions where the crimes have been prohibited, and the number of 
prosecutions on the basis of the crimes. Also, the abundance of international conventions and 
treaties addressing the elements of both crimes are a signal of the nature of interest in the 
crimes.  A logical consequence of the jus cogens character of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity is that every State has the right to investigate, prosecute, punish or extradite alleged 
perpetrators  if found on their territory or any territory under their jurisdiction. Absolute 
universal jurisdiction applies to crimes against humanity and war crimes because of the Hague 
Convention, the Geneva Conventions and the core crimes of the ICC which constitute delicta 
juris gentium.201 With regards to international crimes, a State may unilaterally act upon its legal 
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interests derived from obligation erga omnes.202 With regards to war crimes, the widely ratified 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocol of 1977203 creates an obligation to 
criminalise the extraterritorial commission of acts amounting to war crimes and the 
prosecution of alleged offenders. It is not clear however, whether the ‘grave breaches’ regime 
applies to the offences committed during an internal or a non-international armed conflict, 
particularly with regard to an obligation of third party States to investigate and prosecute 
alleged offenders. A consideration of the pattern with which the ICC Statute deals with both 
categories of crimes might suggest a tolerance to this position. This reasoning has been 
adopted by Cameron who opines that it is ‘without doubt that there is now a permissive rule 
obliging States other than the territorial State to hunt down, prosecute and punish offenders 
present in their territories.’204 For crimes against humanity, while it is impossible to deny the 
existence of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the issue is far from resolved and there is no consensus 
on it.205 By nature, war crimes whether during international or non-international armed conflict 
are particularly gruesome and egregious. The better argument speaks for applying universal 
jurisdiction even in cases of war crimes committed during an internal armed conflict and for 
crimes against humanity.  
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5.1.2.2 The Application of Universal Jurisdiction for Terrorism 
The interests protected by criminalizing terrorism are human rights, legitimately formed 
governments, political processes of the State and international peace and security.206 The major 
question with relation to the crime of terrorism is: Is the acts of terrorism committed in a 
manner that ‘deeply shocks the conscience of humanity’ and generates interests in the 
international community as a whole, understood in the same way like the core crimes of the 
Rome Statute?207 Also, has the international community agreed concerning the norms violated 
by the crime of terrorism for such a time for it to attain an international consensus? This 
presents some challenges as the crime of terrorism will logically run into the same problems 
that make it difficult for it to be subject to an internationally accepted definition. However, in 
this instance, terrorism has been criminalized within the Nigerian legal system. This is the same 
approach utilised by the UN Special Court for Lebanon while applying the provisions of 
Lebanese criminal law on terrorism as the applicable law pursuant to Article 2 of the Tribunal’s 
Statute.208 It would be overambitious to claim that the crime of terrorism has a jus cogens 
character as that is far from the truth. Alternatively, one could consider the crime from the 
perspective of the protected interest. If indeed the protected interests are human rights, 
legitimately formed government, the political processes of States and international peace and 
security, would it be logical to infer that once the protected interests have been violated in a 
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manner that shocks the ‘conscience of humanity’ and could affect ‘international peace and 
security’,  universal jurisdiction should apply? In other words, if the threshold of the violation 
with regards to the crime of terrorism is high enough for the international community to take 
notice, then universal jurisdiction should apply with relation to the crime. The criterion for the 
application of the principle of universal jurisdiction should relate to the heinous nature of the 
crimes and its violations of the interests protected.209 A downside of this trend of argument is 
that it fails to take the context of such acts into consideration. The context is one of the major 
factors that differentiate acts of terrorism from other crimes. The opinion of the Appeals 
Chamber of the Lebanon Tribunal which purports to identify an extant customary international 
crime of transnational terrorism is duly noted.210 One thing is clear however, the practices and 
customs of States with regards to terrorism is largely unsettled, and as such, it is difficult to 
attain a clear determinant on a general assent on whether the crime should be a subject of 
universal jurisdiction or  not. Therefore, the crime of terrorism in my opinion should not be 
subject to universal jurisdiction until such a time that there is a clearer indication of the 
consensus of the international community on its position. An exception to this, in the case of 
Boko Haram is that, all of the neighbouring countries of Nigeria that could utilise universal 
jurisdiction are parties to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism 
and this could provide a uniform legal basis in the exercise of universal jurisdiction.  
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5.2. Establishment of a Mixed Court for Boko Haram 
Internationalized courts and tribunals are patterned after a mixed system combining both 
domestic and international elements. They are usually located in the territory of the State 
where the acts in question were committed and made up of both international and national 
judges and prosecutors with substantive law including national and international elements.211 A 
consideration of the nature of the Boko Haram problem would show that over time, the crimes 
committed have become transnational, albeit sub-regional. Another option to the resolution of 
the problem must be acknowledged. Regardless of the efforts that may or may not be going on 
in Nigeria, with regards to the members of Boko Haram, the offences committed in Niger, Chad 
and Cameroon credited to the same individuals has not been given any attention. Utilising a 
mixed court would be a tidy solution that will take into consideration all the interests of the 
States involved. Historically, establishing international tribunals and special courts have helped 
to cement the idea of individual responsibility for international crimes.212 Mixed Courts have 
been utilised in Cambodia, East Timor, Sierra Leone and Kosovo to end conflict.213 The ongoing 
trial of former Chadian dictator Hissene Habre before the Extraordinary African Chambers in 
the Senegalese Court is also indicative of the fact that such a mixed mechanism can prove to be 
useful.214 One of the major factors that usually lead to the call for internationalized or hybrid 
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Courts or tribunals is the doubt of the possibility of a prosecution or an effective prosecution in 
national courts. 
With regards to the Boko Haram problem, egregious acts violating national laws of at least four 
States and international law have been committed on a large scale since 2009. There is no 
record that any of the other States involved are taking any actions with regards to the 
investigation and prosecution of members of Boko Haram in their custody. Nigeria as a major 
stakeholder is also not taking significant steps to prosecute suspects in custody. The 
establishment of a mixed court could provide the relevant platform where the prosecution of 
the suspects would be carried out in a manner agreed upon by all the parties involved. 
5.3. Concluding Remarks and Recommendations 
5.3.1 Concluding Remarks 
The most serious crimes of international concern as a whole must not go unpunished and their 
effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by 
enhancing international cooperation.215 This is because these grave crimes threaten the peace, 
security and the well-being of the world.216 It is further stated that it is the duty of every state 
to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes’.217 
The acts committed by the Boko Haram group since 2009, in Nigeria and neighbouring 
countries, must not be tolerated by the relevant authorities. An examination of the legal regime 
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of Nigeria has shown the ways in which the crimes may be addressed. First, the argument of 
constitutionalizing the Shari’a legal regime has been shown to be unconstitutional, illegal and 
impractical. Another option is that they may be addressed as ordinary crimes in the Nigerian 
criminal code, which may be inadequate, or as crimes under the national Terrorism Prevention 
Act (TPA).  From the perspective of international crimes, an examination of the 
complementarity regime of the ICC has been done, coupled with a consideration whether the 
acts in question meet the threshold to be dealt with as war crimes and crimes against humanity 
under the Rome Statute. Also, the option of investigation and prosecution under the principle 
of universal jurisdiction or utilising a mixed or hybrid mechanism has been addressed.  
It is clear that with regards to the Boko Haram crimes, there are options available for Nigeria 
and the neighbouring States to utilise to put an end to the violence that currently ravages them 
and ensure that justice is done. This is why the inaction of the government and the 
prosecutorial authority, with key members of Boko Haram in custody, is deeply puzzling.  
5.3.2 Recommendations 
It is essential that the Nigerian authorities intensify their efforts in the investigation and 
prosecution of the suspects in custody. This would help to allay the fears of the citizenry and 
improve the reputation of the government with regards to condoning impunity and large scale 
fundamental rights violations. More importantly, the response of the government in Nigeria to 
the Boko Haram problem has principally been one of military might. Several declarations of 
state of emergency since January 1, 2012, setting up dusk-to-dawn curfews, and setting up joint 
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task forces, among other efforts, have not solved the problem.218 Also, the intervention of the 
AU with setting up a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has also not made a significant 
difference in the violent crimes being committed on an almost daily basis.219  
5.3.2.1 On Domestic Prosecutions 
Apparently, there is a general lack of political will to investigate and prosecute the Boko Haram 
crimes and suspects in custody in Nigeria. This is clear from the lukewarm attitude towards the 
prosecution of suspects who have been in custody since 2009.  The option of prosecution under 
the available domestic legal regime considering the crimes committed have been assessed, it is 
clear that in principle, this would have been the best or the normal response to the crimes. 
However, practically, it does not seem to be realistic as the option has not been effectively 
utilised so far by the Nigerian authorities. The challenges relating to domestic prosecutions are 
acknowledged. The basis of any legal system is its domestic legal regime. However, the attitude 
of the Nigerian prosecutorial authorities to the Boko Haram suspects in custody has been 
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largely un-encouraging and this is why relying on domestic prosecutions, though the most 
obvious, is quite impractical. It is thus not a recommendable option. 
5.3.2.2 On ICC Intervention 
The option of the intervention of the ICC has been assessed in great detail. It is clear that the 
Court is in the position to intervene in the Boko Haram crisis. Also, should the Court decide to 
exercise its prosecutorial discretion and intervene in the Nigerian situation, it could potentially 
result in considerable success. However, considering the inter-relationship between the ICC and 
the African Union as a whole currently, it is doubtful that the Court would decide to investigate 
and prosecute another situation in Africa. The Court would have to take a very careful 
consideration of this circumstance in order not to fuel the perception of bias towards African 
States. The stance of the African Union towards the ICC has become unfriendly in recent 
years.220 If the ICC exercises its prosecutorial discretion in the Nigerian situation, it is doubtful 
that the much needed support would be provided for the Court by the African Union and the 
Nigerian authorities. Therefore, while this option is preferable, it is not the most practical. 
5.3.2.3 On the Application of Universal Jurisdiction and the Establishment of a Mixed Court  
Utilising a mixed court has the potential of taking into account all the previously neglected 
aspects of the Boko Haram problem, lead to a logical end of the conflict and ensure that 
impunity is not allowed to continue unabated. The mixed court may be established pursuant to 
an agreement between Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon, with its seat in any of the four 
                                                             
221 ISS Today June 11 2013 ‘AU-ICC Relationship Under the Spotlight Again’ Available at 
https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/au-icc-relations-under-the-spotlight-again (Accessed on October 15, 
2015). 
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countries. The legal framework of the Court can be agreed upon by the consenting States. To a 
reasonable extent, the countries involved all have fully functional judicial systems, and they are 
all close geographically to make investigations less problematic. Potentially, the Court may be 
composed of experienced prosecutors and judges from the four States. Unlike the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone with three organs (two trial chambers and an appeals chamber), a simple 
model of a trial and appeals chamber should be sufficient. The jurisdiction of the Court should 
include crimes under international law and the national laws of the four States involved 
including elements of the crime of terrorism in the national laws of the States. The Court should 
focus on persons ‘who bear the greatest responsibility for commission of the crimes.’221 This 
would include the egregious crimes committed by the leadership of Boko Haram and the 
military leadership responsible for the most serious violations of rights principally in Nigeria and 
also the other three countries. Funding is usually a major challenge with mechanisms such as 
the proposed mixed court because international or regional justice is typically an expensive 
venture. Potentially, the States in question are in a good position to fund the Court if supported 
by the African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Lake 
Chad Basin Commission Countries (LCBC) to which they all belong.  
Utilising a special/mixed court as a response to the Boko Haram problem comes with many 
advantages. In the first instance, the interests of all the States involved would be taken into 
account. This implies that those who have committed the most serious crimes of concern can 
be held accountable. A mixed Court also provides a forum where offences committed in four 
                                                             
221 This is the approach recommended by the UN Security Council in Resolution 1315(2000) with regards to 
the personal jurisdiction of the Special Court of Sierra Leone. 
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different States would be brought under a uniform legal regime, thus providing the needed 
legal uniformity and certainty. With regards to practical issues like support and technical 
assistance, a mixed court of this form has a higher potential of success because of the resources 
that can be contributed by States involved. Also, as evidenced by the Hissene Habre trial, the 
support of the African Union and other sub-regional organisations is crucial for the success of 
this mechanism. Utilising a mixed court as a response to this problem would also ensure that 
the individuals that are responsible for the commission of these egregious crimes are held 
personally responsible through a uniform regime. 
It is acknowledged that the option of a mixed court to account for the crimes committed in all 
the four countries is not a simple option, indeed it is a technical, expensive and potentially, a 
time consuming venture. However, it has the capacity to see that justice is done for the violent 
crimes that have been committed since 2009 and send a message that impunity is not to be 
tolerated. 
With regards to the options of the application of universal jurisdiction by third States and the 
establishment of a mixed court, both present a more practical and foreseeable response to the 
Boko Haram problem. A major advantage is that with relation to both options, the lack of 
political will by the Nigerian government does not hinder justice being done. Both options also 
give the opportunity for the development of an African solution to what is essentially an African 
problem. Either of the two mechanisms although idealistic, are the most practical responses to 
the Boko Haram problem.  
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